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Main Line v. Basinger and the Mixed
Motive Manager:
Reexamining the Agent's Privilege
to Induce Breach of Contract
by
STEPHEN P. CLARK*

Introduction
In Main Line Pictures,Inc. v. Basinger,1 an independent production company sued Kim Basinger for breaching an oral agreement to
appear in the film Boxing Helena. On March 24, 1993, the jury ruled
for Main Line Pictures on the contract claim and ordered Basinger to
pay $8.92 million in damages. 2 Since then, pundits and lawyers alike
have speculated whether the verdict against Basinger will change the
way Hollywood does business.3 Main Line's tortious inducement
claim against International Creative Management (ICM), Basinger's
agent at the time of the breach has received far less attention. The
* J.D. Candidate, 1995; B.A. Wake Forest University, 1990. The author would like
to thank Elizabeth L. Clark for her love and support.
1. Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC031180. Also named as defendants in
the lawsuit were Mighty Wind Productions, Inc. and International Creative Management,
Inc.
2. Kathleen O'Steen, "Helena" Costs Kim Arm anda Leg, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 25,
1993, at 1. The Second District Court of Appeal later reversed the judgment and remanded the case for retrial because the special verdicts referred to "Basinger and/or
Mighty Wind" (her loan-out corporation). Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No.
B077509, slip op. at 10 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994). Such "and/or" jury instructions "are
prejudicially ambiguous and require reversal." Id at 15. The court of appeal did not reach
the merits of the case, and counsel for both Main Line and Basinger described the reversal
as "based on a technicality." Judy Brennan & Edward J. Boyer, DamagesAgainst Basinger
Overturned,L.A. Tmms, Sept. 23, 1994, at B1. Main Line has vowed to retry the case. Id.
3. See e.g., Claudia Eller & Andy Marx, Hollywood's Case of the Shakes, DAILY
VARIETY, Mar. 25, 1993, at 1; Steve Ginsberg, Basinger Award Forces Hollywood to Rethink Tradition, L.A. Bus. 3., Apr. 5, 1993, at 4; Douglas Kari, Basinger in a Box: Verbal
Contracts in the Film Industry, Er. L. REP., July 1993, at 3; Barry A. Menes & Mark
Messineo, Oral Contractand More Results in Multimillion DollarVerdict Against Kim Basingerfor Failure to Star in 'Boxing Helena;' 4 Err. L. REv. 157 (1993); Michael I. Rudell,
Liability Under Verbal Agreements, N.Y. L.J., May 28, 1993, at 3; Jay M. Spillane, Lawsuits
over "HandshakeDeals" Are as Old as the EntertainmentIndustry (and Can Be Easily
Avoided), EiNT. & SPORTS LAW., Spring 1993, at 15.
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dismissal of the claim against ICM on the last day of the trial4 was the
catalyst for this Note.
In its complaint, Main Line alleged that Basinger's agent, Guy
McElwaine, knowing that Basinger was obligated to appear in Boxing
Helena, induced her to breach the contract by convincing her that the
film would be bad for her image.5 The oral agreement to appear in
Boxing Helena, confirmed in a deal memo on or about February 27,
1991,6 was negotiated by Basinger's former agent, Bill Block of InterTalent. 7 Therefore, any commission earned on the project would
have gone to InterTalent, not to ICM. 8 In April 1991 Basinger
switched from InterTalent to ICM where McElwaine, "one of the
most well-known agents in Hollywood," became her new agent. 9
Main Line alleged that because McElwaine was not going to receive a
commission on Basinger's contract to appear in Boxing Helena, he actively counseled Basinger to pull out of the project and orchestrated
her denial of the contract's existence. 10
On the last day of trial, Judge Chirlin granted ICM's motion for
nonsuit based on the "manager's privilege."" California courts have
defined this privilege as follows: "[A] manager or agent may, with
impersonal or disinterested motive, properly endeavor to protect the
interests of his principal by counseling the breach of a contract with a
third party which he reasonably believes to be harmful to his employer's best interests.' u 2 The agent's motive therefore would appear
to be the critical factor in determining whether he was privileged to
4. See Kathleen O'Steen, Judge Drops ICM from "Helena" Suit, DAILY VARIETY,
Mar. 23, 1993, at 1.
5. Verified Complaint of Main Line Pictures, Inc. at 10-11 (No. BC031180).
6. Despite all the publicity concerning informal oral contracts in the entertainment
industry, Carl Mazzacone, the president of Main Line, emphasized that "this was no handshake deal or some agreement scrawled on a cocktail napkin ....What I stood up for is
the 'deal memo.' That is what this town operates on." Judy Brennan, Is She the Villainor a Victim?, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1994, (Calendar), at 6. As the court of appeal explained,
"Because timing is critical, film industry contracts are frequently oral agreements based on
unsigned 'deal memos.' . . . The absence of an executed written agreement does not mean
there is no legally binding agreement." Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509,
slip op. at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994).
7. Trial Brief of Main Line Pictures, Inc. at 7 (No. BC031180) [hereinafter Main Line
Trial Brief].
8. Id.
9. Id. McElwaine is the former chairman of Columbia Pictures. DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BusiNEss OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 1 (1992).
10. Main Line Trial Brief, supra note 7, at 8; see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
11. Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509, slip op. at 9 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1994). See also Trial Brief of International Creative Management, Inc. at 6-9 (No.
BC031180) [hereinafter ICM Trial Brief] (contending that ICM was protected by the manager's privilege); O'Steen, supra note 4, at 1 (citing the manager's privilege as the basis for
the ICM dismissal).
12. Olivet v. Frischling, 164 Cal. Rptr. 87, 92 (Ct. App. 1980).
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induce the breach. However, in Los Angeles Airways v. Davis13 , the

Ninth Circuit transformed a qualified privilege1 4 into an absolute privilege. Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's motiva-5
tion was a subjective, fact-based question best reserved for the jury,'
the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant-an
attorney, officer, and director for the various breaching parties.16 Because agents rarely, if ever, act with entirely selfless motives, the court
reasoned that as long as an agent is motivated in part by a desire to
protect the best interests of the principal, the agent's advice should be
privileged. 17 Thus, after Los Angeles Airways, an agent whose advice
is predominantly self-serving is nevertheless completely protected
from liability to third parties as long as the agent harbored a scintilla
of desire to benefit the principal.
This Note contends that the Los Angeles Airways "mixed motive"
rule should no longer be the law in California. 18 Part I reviews the
development of the tort of interference with contract. 19 Part II discusses the manager's privilege and the various actors to which it applies. Part III critiques the mixed motive rule using the facts of Main
Line v. Basinger. Part IV proposes that the finder of fact should decide the question of privilege by applying the predominant motive
rule used in defamation and malicious prosecution cases, and addresses existing criticism of the predominant motive rule as applied in
another jurisdiction.
13. 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982).
14. The Los Angeles Airways court acknowledged that "the privilege is qualified and
not absolute. Where the intent is not proper, the privilege is lost." Id. at 325. But see
Aalgaard v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, Inc., 274 Cal. Rptr. 81, 86-87 (Ct. App. 1990) (commenting that since Los Angeles Airways, the question of whether the manager's privilege is
qualified or absolute has become "somewhat muddled in California law").
15. 687 F.2d at 326-27.
16. Id. at 323.
17. Id. at 328.
18. The rule was adopted by the California courts in Shapoff v. Scull, 272 Cal. Rptr.
480,486 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds,Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi
Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454,456 (Cal. 1994). See infra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
19. This Note is limited to interference with existing contracts and does not address
the separate tort of interference with prospective contractual relations. See W. PAGE KEETON ET A., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 981 (5th ed. 1984)
("Existence of a contract, as distinct from a mere prospect of business, may therefore narrow the range of interference that may be considered proper by a defendant in pursuit of
his own ends, with the result that liability may be more expansive where there is an actual
contract."); Lillian BeVier, ReconsideringInducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 935 (1990) (citing the failure of courts and commentators to keep inducement distinct from other torts as
a source of uncertainty in practice); James B. Sales, The Tort of Interference with Contract:
An Argument for Requiring a "Valid Existing Contract" to Restrain the Use of Tort Law in
Circumventing ContractLaw Remedies, 22 T"x. TEcH L. REv. 123, 125 (1991) (emphasizing the "clear distinction" between interference with contract and interference with pro-

spective relations).
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I. Interference with Contract
A. Development of the Tort
The modem tort of interference with contract originated in the
English case of Lumley v. Gye,2 0 a case that, like Main Line v. Basinger, involved the breach of an executory personal services contract
by an entertainer. Joanna Wagner, an opera performer, had agreed to

sing exclusively at the plaintiff's theatre for the 1852 season, only to be

enticed away by another impresario.2 ' Although Wagner was "a dra-

matic artiste, not a servant in any sense,122 the Queen's Bench broad-

ened an existing cause of action for enticing another master's servant
to any case "where the defendant maliciously procures a party, who is
under a valid contract to give her exclusive personal services to the
plaintiff for a specified period, to refuse to give such services." 3 The
opinion repeatedly emphasized the defendant's "malicious" motive
for inducing the breach.2 4 From the tort's inception, therefore, motive
was a critical factor to determine
liability for inducement effected by
25
inherently nontortious means.
Although years passed before the interference tort became
widely accepted in England,2 6 the Lumley doctrine received a warm
reception in most of the United States.2 7 The tort complemented the
belief, widely held around the turn of the century, that the right to
performance under an executory contract constituted a judicially enforceable property right.28 Like all property, the right to performance
20. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
21. Id. at 750.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 755. For a thorough discussion of the tort's historical antecedents, see Note,
Tortious Interference with ContractualRelations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract,and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1511-21 (1980).
24. Defense counsel argued that "[t]he averment of malice can make no difference. If
the action does not lie without malice, it does not lie with it." 118 Eng. Rep. at 751. Nevertheless, the concurring judges referred to "malice" more than 40 times in their opinions.
25. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. b (1939) ("The significance of
Lumley v. Gye lies in its extension of the rule of liability to non-tortious methods of
inducement.").
26. See David F. Partlett, From Victorian Opera to Rock and Rap: Inducement to
Breach of Contractin the Music Industry, 66 TUL. L. REv. 771, 779-82 (1992) (discussing
early criticisms of the Lumley decision).
27. Id. at 783. But see Bourlier v. Macauley, 15 S.W. 60 (Ky. 1891) (rejecting an interference claim against a theater owner who induced an actress to breach her contract with a
rival owner).
28. Partlett, supra note 26, at 784; see also Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 A.
230, 232 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1902) ("That the interest of an employer or an employee in a contract for services is property is conceded."); S.C. Posner Co. v. Jackson, 119 N.E. 573, 574
(N.Y. 1918) (describing an employment contract as a property right); Charles E. Carpenter, Interference with ContractRelations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 728,733 (1928) (describing the
right to performance as "a right against everyone, a right in rem"). The notion of the right
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needed to be protected
against theft, and the interference tort seemed
29
a perfect tool.
On the other hand, the tort conflicted with a primary tenet of
capitalism-the right to compete for scarce resources, including labor.30 This clash between property and competition made it difficult
for courts to set bright-line rules and demonstrated the weaknesses of
formalism. 31 One effort to craft rules of general application was the
introduction of privileges that justified inducement in certain circumstances based on the defendant's status vis-a-vis the breaching party.32
Others searching for a mediating influence emphasized the presence
or absence of malice.3 3 However, as critics pointed out, it could be
quite unclear what constituted "malicious motives" in any given
case. 4 The response to this defect was judicial balancing.3 5 By weighing a predetermined set of factors representing the various individual
to performance as property has been revived more recently in the bankruptcy context.
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code forbids "any act ... to exercise control over property of the estate" as a violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). TWo
leading bankruptcy commentators have noted that "[a]n attempt to terminate might be
seen as an effort to exercise control over property of the debtor (the property being the
right of the debtor to the performance of the third party) that violates the automatic stay
....
" DouGLAs G. BArD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON BANKRuPTcY 277-78 (2d ed. 1990). See also In re Computer Communications, Inc., 824
F.2d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an attempt to terminate an executory contract
violated the automatic stay).
29.
It seems to us that where a party has entered into a contract with another to do or
not to do a particular act or acts, he has as clear a right to its performance as he
has to his property, either real or personal; and that knowingly to induce the
other party to violate it is as distinct a wrong as it is to injure or destroy his
property.
Raymond v. Yarrington, 73 S.W. 800, 803 (Tex. 1903). This line of reasoning has also appeared in several recent efforts to justify the interference tort. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J.
LEGAL SrUD. 1, 7-19 (1987); Benjamin L. Fine, Comment, An Analysis of the Formation of
Property Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1116, 1139-44 (1983).
30. This conflict has been emphasized in several recent critiques of the interference
tort. See, e.g., Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contractand Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and ContractDoctrine,49 U. Cm. L. Ruv. 61, 78 (1982) ("It is
startling that doctrine of this sort is superimposed on an economic order committed to
competition.").
31. Note, supra note 23, at 1529-37. Oliver Wendell Holmes criticized the mechanistic, rules-oriented approach, noting that "it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained
merely by logic and general propositions of law which nobody disputes." Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32. See, eg., Carpenter, supra note 28, at 745-62 (describing various qualified
privileges).
33. Note, supra note 23, at 1535-37.
34. Id.at 1537.
35. Id. at 1538-40.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

and societal interests at stake in every case, courts hoped to avoid
both categorical rules and gross inconsistency.
B. The Restatement Approach

The First Restatement provided a list of factors36 to be balanced
"in determining whether there is a privilege" to induce a breach of
contract. 37 Interestingly, the authors did not abandon the concept of
malice, but instead defined it as "not malice in the sense of ill will but
merely purposeful interference without justification. ' 38 It was under
the rubric of justification that the balancing took place. If an inducer's
purpose coincided with the societal purpose behind a given privilege,
he escaped liability. 39 Thus, a business advisor was privileged to advise a breach of contract, but only40if he acted in good faith and within
the scope of a request for advice.
41
Because the First Restatement eschewed narrowly defined rules
but still retained the notion of status-based privileges, 42 courts continued to vary widely in their treatment of the interference tort, even

within the same state.43 Perhaps this was because, as the First Re36. The factors were "(a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the nature of the
expectancy with which his conduct interferes, (c) the relations between the parties, (d) the
interest sought to be advanced by the actor and (e) the social interests in protecting the
expectancy on the one hand and the actor's freedom of action on the other hand." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 767 (1939).
37. Id. "The issue is whether in the given circumstances [defendant's] interest and the
social interest in allowing the freedom claimed by [defendant] are sufficient to outweigh
the harm that his conduct is designed to produce." Id § 766 cmt. b.
38. Id. § 766 cmt. m; accord, Carpenter, supra note 28, at 734 (malice refers to inducement without justification and not "malevolence, spite, or ill will"); BAJI No. 7.34 (7th ed.
1986) ("Malice means that attitude or state of mind which actuates the doing of an act for
some improper or wrongful motive or purpose. It does not necessarily require that the
defendant be angry or vindictive or bear any actual hostility or ill will toward the
plaintiff.").
39. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. m (1939).
40. Id. § 767 cmt. d. See also § 772 (privilege to advise).
41. "[T]he question on the issue of privilege is whether the actor's conduct was fair
and reasonable under the circumstances ....
" Id § 767 cmt. d.
42. See id.§§ 768-70 (listing privileges for a competitor, for a person with a financial
interest in the business of the breaching party, and for a person responsible for the welfare
of another).
43. Compare Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1963) (holding
that corporate agents were immune from liability when acting on behalf of the corporation
despite "malicious" acts), overruled on other grounds by Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton
Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 456 (Cal. 1994) with Golden v. Anderson, 64 Cal. Rptr.
404 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding that agents were not immunized by the fact that they acted in
their capacity as corporate managers). See also Barbara Tuttle Gamer, The Agent's Privilege to Interfere Intentionally with ContractualRelations: A Reappraisalof CaliforniaLaw,
12 CAL. W. L. REv. 475, 476-77 (1976) (describing the conflict between a balancing approach and a privilege based on the scope of an agent's employment).
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statement's authors noted, "this branch of the law [had] not crystallized a complete set of definite rules as to the existence or nonexistence of privilege .... "" However, when the authors of the Second Restatement completed their work some forty years later, they
likewise concluded that "the law in this area has not fully congealed
but is still in a formative stage."45
Nevertheless, the Second Restatement does take a somewhat different approach. Avoiding the confusing notions of privilege, justification, and malice, it bases liability on whether the interference at
issue was "improper. '46 Thus, it provides that "[o]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract...
is subject to liability." 47 Impropriety, like justification before it, is determined by balancing a list of factors: 48 "The determination of
whether an interference is improper depends upon a comparative appraisal of these factors. And the decision is, whether it was improper
under the circumstances-that is under the particular facts of the individual case, not in terms of rules of law or generalizations." 49 As the
Second Restatement emphasizes the factually oriented nature of the
inquiry into impropriety, it also reframes the specific privileges in sections 768-72 as guidelines to help define impropriety in certain circum44.

RESrATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§ 767 cmt. a (1939).

45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 37 (1979). The
Note explained that no consensus had formed as to the meaning of justification or whether
justification was an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case or an affirmative defense to
be proved by the defendant. See also id. § 767 cmt. k (disagreement as to who bears the
burden of proof of impropriety). The question of who must prove justification has been
settled in California: the burden is on the defendant once the plaintiff has established that
the inducement was intentional. A.F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific Professional Ins., Inc., 104
Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App. 1972).
46. RESTATEmENT (SEcOND)OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 37 (1979).
47. Il § 766A.
48. Id. § 767. The new list added two factors, "the actor's motive" and "the interests
of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes." Id. Thus, in addition to reaffirming
the importance of the defendant's motive, the new list emphasized the plaintiff's proprietary interest in performance.
49. Id. at Introductory Note to Chapter 37; see also 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL..,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.12, at 351 ("There is no rule of thumb to be applied in every case.
The good sense of the tribunal must be employed to analyze the circumstances and determine in each case on which side of the line it falls."); BeVier, supra note 19, at 884 n.20
("The factfinder is left to her own devices in assigning relative weight to each factor, since
the drafters acknowledge that 'the weight carried by these factors may vary considerably."'
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECONrD) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. a (1979)); Note, supra note 23, at
1539 ("No interest of either party is so absolute that the other party will not at times
succeed in the litigation. Each case rests on its own facts, and the process of 'weighing' the
various interests involved admits of sufficient discretion to permit courts to override a
party's claim of defense if social policy so requires.").
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stances.5 0 Therefore, even when a status-based privilege is asserted,
summary51judgment is usually inappropriate, especially when motive is
at issue.
C. The Tort in California

California courts were initially reluctant to approve of the inducement tort and seemed particularly uncomfortable with its emphasis on
malice. In Boyson v. Thorn,5 2 the California Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the rule of Lumley v. Gye, holding that:
[A]n act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done with a bad intent ....It is conceded that one
may lawfully persuade or procure another to break his contract with
a third person, "if it be done from good motives."
We think the
53
qualification has no place in the proposition.

Eventually, in Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier,5 4 Justice Traynor adopted
the majority rule 55 imposing liability for inducing a breach by lawful
means unless the inducement was justified by "an interest that has
'5 6
greater social value than insuring the stability of the contract.
Moreover, the court explicitly favored the contractual property right
to the right to competition: "[C]ontractual stability is generally
ac' '57
cepted as of greater importance than competitive freedom.
The case foreshadowed a vast expansion of contract-based tort
liability in California to take place over the next fifty years. 58 For example, the inducement tort has been expanded to cover conduct that
does not actually induce a breach, but merely makes performance of
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 767 ("Competition as Proper or
Improper Interference").
51. As one commentator has noted:
Because of the ambiguities inherent in the motive inquiry in tortious interference law, many questionable cases can survive summary judgment.... Courts
apply the widely accepted rule that summary judgment is inappropriate in cases
where intent is an issue. Further, courts often emphasize that tortious interference claims should be resolved on a case-by-case basis, generally by a jury ....
Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MImN. L. REv. 1097, 1132-33 (1993). See also 2 RUDOLF
CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITON, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 9.02 (4th ed. 1981)
(commenting that in inducement cases "[t]he defendant's motive is a jury question").
52. 33 P. 492 (Cal. 1893).
53. Id. at 494-95.
54. 112 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1941).
55. See 5 B.E. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 643 (9th ed. 1987) (describing Imperial Ice as adopting the majority rule).
56. 112 P.2d at 632 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 767 (1939)).
57. Id. at 633.
58. See John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of
Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REv.
1491, 1505 (1981) (describing California's "progressively more expansive view of the kinds
of commercial interests deserving of tort protection").
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the contract "more expensive or burdensome." 59 Tort law now protects not only valid existing contracts, but also unenforceable contracts 60 and mere expectancies. 61 It even protects prospective
economic advantages from negligent interference. 62 However, the
most dramatic demonstration of California's willingness to use tort
law to insure contractual integrity is the tort of bad faith denial of
contract.
In Seaman's DirectBuying Service v. StandardOil Co.,63 the California Supreme Court recognized "that a party to a contract may incur
tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to
shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." 64 The court held that denying the
existence of a contract-an act essential to the defense in most contract suits-would nevertheless give rise to liability when undertaken
in bad faith or, in other words, from improper motives. 65
This was, of course, a far cry from the Boyson court's refusal to
base liability on intent. However, in recent years, the California
courts have manifested a strange new uneasiness about the inquiry
into motive and have provided a license for the same sort of self-interested inducement at issue in Lumley v. Gye. This license is the manager's privilege.
H. The Manager's Privilege
The term "manager's privilege" actually refers to several distinct
privileges applied for different reasons to various types of business
relationships.
A. Corporate Employees

One of the earliest recognized privileges was that of a corporate
employee who, acting within the scope of his authority, caused his em59. Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 359 P.2d 465, 469 (Cal. 1961).
60. Zimmerman v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Assoc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323
(Ct. App. 1961).
61. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 872 (Cal. 1975).
62. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979); see KEETON ET AL., supra
note 19, § 130, at 1008 (noting that J'Aire would "permit liability based on negligence in
any case where a balancing of such factors as foreseeability, closeness of connection and
moral blame seem to the decision-maker to warrant such a result").
63. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
64. Id. at 1167.
65. Because the evidence was in conffict as to the defendant's motive for denying the
existence of the contract, the Seaman's court remanded the case for the jury to determine
whether the denial was in bad faith. lML at 1170. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying
text.
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ployer to breach a contract with a third person. 66 A number of reasons have been given for this privilege. Some courts have emphasized67
the confidential relationship between an employee and employer.
This view is reflected in the Second Restatement. 68 Others have defined the employee, especially one with managerial responsibilities, as
the alter ego of the corporation.69 As a party to the contract, such an
employee cannot be liable for inducing its breach.70 Still others have
noted that the privilege of an officer or director to interfere with the
71
corporation's contracts is consistent with the business judgment rule.
The corporate employee's privilege is qualified, however, not absolute. Courts have consistently held that corporate directors,72 officers, 73 and even owners 74 must act with a proper motive for the

66. Said v. Butt, 3 K.B. 497 (1920). The court was quick to point out that an advisor
"who stood wholly outside the area of the bargain made between the two contracting parties" would be prima facie liable for inducing a breach to serve the advisor's own interests.
Id. at 505. See generally Alfred Avins, Liability for Inducing a Corporationto Breach Its
Contract,43 CORNELL L.Q. 55 (1957).
67. "[O]rdinarily corporate agents and employees acting for and on behalf of the corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation's contract since
being in a confidential relationship to the corporation their action in this respect is privileged." Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (Ct. App. 1963), overruled on
other grounds, Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 456 (Cal.
1994).
68. The Second Restatement explains that, under certain circumstances, it is not improper for a corporate employee to interfere with the corporation's contracts and gives the
following illustration based on Said v. Butt:
B, an employee of [a public] corporation, repeatedly appears on duty in an intoxicated condition, in a manner damaging to its business relations. C, another employee, for the protection of the corporation, reports this to the manager and
urges him to discharge B. He does so. C's action is not improper.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 cmt. b, illus. 3 (1979).
69. American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d. 331, 335 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991) (explaining that doctors could not interfere with a hospital's business relations because they were its alter egos).
70. "A party to a business relationship cannot tortiously interfere with himself. Liability must be founded upon the acts of an interfering third party." Id. (citation omitted).
The Giurintano court emphasized the close alignment of interests between the employer
and employee and cited, by analogy, the Fifth Circuit's holding that a parent corporation
and its subsidiary are the same entity for tortious interference purposes. Id. at 336 (citing
Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985)).
71. Asbestos Workers Local Union 42 v. Absolute Envtl. Serv., 814 F. Supp 392, 400
(D. Del. 1993). The business judgment rule is a presumption against personal liability of
officers and directors for their decisions on behalf of the corporation. Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984). See also James C. Cook & Lisa M. Pennock, Qualified
Privilege in Intentional Interference with Contract Cases, 79 ILL. B.J. 90, 92 (1991) (noting
that courts typically refuse to second-guess business decisions by corporate directors and
officers).
72. Avins, supra note 66, at 58.
73. Id. at 60.
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privilege to apply.75 Otherwise, they may be personally liable to the
corporation's aggrieved promisees.
B. Attorneys
Attorneys who advise their clients to breach a contract have been
76
accorded a similar privilege, though for somewhat different reasons. 77
While some states have defined the attorney's privilege as absolute,
this is not the rule in California. 78 The attorney-client relationship
may not be used by an attorney "as a cloak for his own self-serving
interference with [a] contract." 79 However, the confidential nature of
the attorney-client relationship will be considered in balancing the interests at stake in each individual case. 80
74. Shapoff v. Scull, 272 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that ownership
and control of a corporate entity do not give rise to privilege unless the owner acts to
protect the corporation's interest), overruled on other grounds, Applied Equip. Corp. v.
Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 456 (Cal. 1994).
75.
The common thread found throughout the decisions is that the corporate officer
must act with a 'proper motive' to be granted the protection of the privilege.
'Proper motive' encompasses the scope of authority provided to the corporate
actor and the corporate actor's intent to act in the best interests of the
corporation.
Kevin Paul Laundreneau, Note, Piercingthe Corporate Vei" PersonalLiability of a Corporate Officer for Intentional Interference with Contract: 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 51
LA. L. REv. 141, 156 (1990).
76. See, eg., Judianne Jaffe, License to Kill-Strengtheningthe Attorney's Privilege to
Advise Clients Not to Perform Contracts,ENT. & SPORTS LAw., Summer 1985, at 9. Jaffe
points out that by adding an inducement claim against the breaching party's litigation
counsel, a plaintiff can create a conflict of interest, requiring the defendant either to obtain
independent advice regarding the conflict or to hire a new lawyer. Id. at 11. She concludes
that such concurrent claims should be strictly limited. Id. at 12. See also H. Robert
Fiebach, A Chilling of the Adversary System An Attorney's Exposure to Liability from
Opposing Partiesand Counsel, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1301, 1312 (1988) (noting that "courts

have uniformly applied the shield of the judicial privilege to bar claims for tortious interference...."); Laurie P. Cohen, A White Shoe Firm, a Rock Band and a Threat,WALL ST.
J., July 29, 1994, at B1 (describing how "the tactic of suing opposing counsel enables a
litigant 'to weaken the opposition because they have to focus on defending a collateral
lawsuit"').
77. Greyhound Corp. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (App.
Div. 1940) (establishing New York rule immunizing attorneys from interference liability).
78. "An attorney has no absolute privilege to interfere with contractual relations,
whether those of his client or anyone else. To the contrary, the existence of an attorneyclient, or some other fiduciary relationship with a party to the contract is, at most, the
beginning not the end of the inquiry." Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 180, 198 (Ct. App. 1983), overruledon other grounds,Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton
Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 456 (Cal. 1994).
79. Id. See also Furlev Sales & Assocs. v. North American Automotive Warehouse,
325 N.W.2d 20,27 (Minn. 1982) (explaining that an attorney is liable for interference when
motivated by personal interests).
80. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
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The defendant in Los Angeles Airways v. Davis81 was an attorofficer, and director for the various breaching parties. 83 Unfortunately, rather than evaluating his conduct by reference to his
84
specific roles, the court broadly referred to him as an "advisor."
However, all advisors are not created equal. Typically, attorneys and
corporate employees do not stand to benefit from a breach of contract
by their clients or employers.8 5 The same cannot be said of other advisors, who may profit either by personally taking the place of the
original promisee or by arranging for someone else to do S0.86
ney, 82

This distinction was clearly drawn in Olivet v. Frischling,s7 a California case that addressed the impact of a potential profit motive on
the manager's privilege. In Olivet the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital directors caused the hospital to sever its sale/lease-back
arrangement with him so that a leasing partnership they had formed
could take his place.88 Rejecting the defendants' argument that their
confidential relationship with the hospital gave rise to an absolute
privilege,8 9 the court held that
when a manager induces a breach in the hopes that he himself might
fill the resultant economic void, he acts not as a servant, i.e., as one
upholding his master's best interests, but rather as a naked competitor, devoid of the protections accorded those who labor under standards of fidelity, good faith and fiduciary responsibility. 90
Because motive is a question of fact, 91 it would follow that, in cases
like Olivet in which the evidence strongly suggests a defendant may
have acted primarily in self-interest, the finder of fact should decide
whether the privilege applies. This would have been the case in Main
Line v. Basinger were it not for the mixed motive rule.
81. 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982).
82. Most commentary on the Los Angeles Airways decision has focused on the defendant's role as an attorney. See, e.g., Vincent Robert Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm
Clients by DepartingPartnersandAssociates: Tort,Fiduciary,and DisciplinaryLiability, 50
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 90 n.378 (1988); William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite
Bar in New York City, 1960-1980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413, 437 (1990).
83. Los Angeles Airways, 687 F.2d at 323.
84. "Because Davis would have been protected in either capacity, we need not consider whether there is a difference in the scope of the privilege or which privilege is applicable to an advisor who acts in two different capacities for one principal." Id. at 326.
85. Corporate officers and lawyers cannot be regarded "as persons who have received
the labor that has been previously promised the plaintiff." Epstein, supra note 29, at 29.
86. Professor Epstein describes these advisors as "outsiders whose incentives differ
markedly from those of a firm's lawyers and business executives," noting that the distinction between those who stand to benefit from the breach and those who do not has been
made for centuries. Id.
87. 164 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Ct. App. 1980).
88. Id. at 88-89.
89. Id. at 91.
90. Id. at 92.
91. See supra note 51.
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HI. The Mixed Motive Rule
A.

The Origin of the Rule

In Los Angeles Airways v. Davis,9 the Ninth Circuit applied California law to facts similar to those in Olivet. Los Angeles Airways
alleged that Davis, an attorney for Howard Hughes and two of his
companies and an officer and director of another Hughes company,
induced his various principals to breach an oral agreement to
purchase the plaintiffs assets.93 This allegedly enabled Hughes to acquire the assets later at a lower cost.94 The only self-interested motive
alleged by the plaintiff was Davis's desire to improve his position
within the Hughes organization. 95 The case was distinguishable from
Olivet in that Davis did not intend personally to assume the position
of Los Angeles Airways. Nor did he stand to earn a commission by
arranging for another company to enter into a similar contract with his
principals.
96
However, the Ninth Circuit was not content with this distinction
and raised an issue neither Olivet nor any other California decision
had addressed-the question of "mixed motives. ' 97 In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, the court went out of its way to
establish that the manager's privilege was available to any advisor
even slightly motivated by his principal's best interest:
We conclude that where, as here, an advisor is motivated in
part by a desire to benefit his principal, his conduct in inducing a
breach of contract should be privileged. The privilege is designed to
further certain societal interests by fostering uninhibited advice by
agents to their principals. The goal of the privilege is promoted by
protecting advice that is motivated, even in part, by a good faith
intent to benefit the principal's interest. 98
While it pays lip service to the fact that the privilege is qualified, 99 the
Los Angeles Airways opinion undermines any real qualification. If all
92. 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982).
93. Id. at 323.
94. Id. at 324.
95. Id. at 324 n.2.
96. Judge Reinhardt did comment,
An agent naturally hopes that by providing beneficial advice to his principal, the
agent will benefit indirectly by gaining the further trust and confidence of his principal. If the protection of the privilege were denied every time that an advisor
acted with such mixed motive, the privilege would be greatly diminished ....
Id. at 328 (emphasis added). While one plausible reading of the case is that the mixed
motive absolute privilege applies only when the possible self-interest is a desire to improve
the agent's standing with principal, this would not explain the result in Main Line v.
Basinger.
97. Id. at 328.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 325.
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an agent has to do is raise a plausible inference that he acted in the

principal's best interests, the privilege is absolute in effect, if not in
theory.
B. The Effect of the Rule
It should come as no surprise that, in Main Line v. Basinger, ICM
cited Los Angeles Airways and argued in its trial brief that
[i]f any of ICM's actions are found to have been to counsel Basinger
to breach a purported contract to perform in the Film, such action
was privileged because ICM believed that it would be harmful to
Basinger's interests to perform in the Film.... McElwaine did not
believe the script, as written, was good, and did not believe that it
would make a good movie. He does not believe that it is ever good
for any of his stars to act in a bad movie, and he was and is absolutely privileged to advise his clients not to act in what he believes
to be a bad motion picture. 1°°
Under the mixed motive rule, even when an agent may reap financial
rewards by being able to commission his clients in other projects, 10 1 he
is absolutely privileged0 2to induce a breach of contract, provided he
does not like the film.'
Main Line cited considerable circumstantial evidence from which
the jury might have inferred that McElwaine induced the breach.
Before changing agents, Basinger had referred to the screenplay as
"beautiful and magical" and had repeatedly assured Jennifer Lynch,
the director of Boxing Helena, that she would appear in the film, commenting, "Who do they think I am, Madonna? Of course I'm doing
100. ICM Trial Brief, supra note 11, at 8-9.
101. Carl Mazzacone, who tried to salvage the deal by offering McElwaine a commission on "Boxing Helena," testified that McElwaine "turned it down and went on to say
how he can put Kim Basinger in so many projects in the next few months that she could
make $14 million this week, that he didn't need my commission." Reporter's Transcript at
851 (No. BC031180).
102. In a declaration accompanying its motion for nonsuit, ICM cited the following
excerpts from ICM counsel Howard Weitzman's cross-examination of Carl Mazzacone:
Q. You are aware that agents or part of an agent's responsibility, are you not, is
to advise clients of what they think about projects?
A. Yes, sir....
Q. If [McElwaine] were to tell [Basinger] he thought it was the worst project in
the world for her to appear in a movie with explicit sex scenes and ultimately
no arms and no legs, you think that would be appropriate advice if that's what
he felt, correct?
A. That is within his right, sir.
Transcript, supra note 101, at 1007-08. This testimony ignores the critical difference between giving a client advice about which contracts she should enter and giving her advice
about which contracts she should breach. The former may indeed be "within his right,"
while the latter may be actionable depending on the agent's motive.
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their movie."' 03 Lynch testified that two days after learning of Basinger's switch to ICM, she met with McElwaine: "'He told us that
while he had tremendous respect for my writing talent, that he did not
want Kim to do the picture .... He was telling her not to do the
picture."'
Moreover, the fact that McElwaine would earn nothing
on Boxing Helena, a project negotiated before he became Basinger's
agent, suggests a self-interested motive. 05
The jury's award of an additional $1.5 million for Basinger's bad
faith denial of her contract' 0 6 suggests that it accepted what Main
Line's trial attorney, Patricia Glaser, referred to in her closing argument as the "big conspiracy" theory of the case. 0 7 According to Main
Line:
"It started with a phone call on May 7, 1991, between Guy
McElwaine and Julie Philips." After reading the script, Glaser said,
McElwaine-who had just become Basinger's agent at ICM and
who was clearly disenchanted with "Boxing Helena"-called
Philips, the star's lawyer, and said, "We have a problem." "It was at
that point that Guy told Julie to call Carl Mazzocone and tell him
that changes had to be made to the script, even though Kim had
said she loved the script back in February," Glaser said. "What was
happening was that Julie, Guy and Kim were devising a scheme for
103. Menes & Messineo, supra note 3, at 157. Madonna had previously pulled out of
the project four weeks before production was set to begin, costing Main Line $500,000 in
preproduction expenses. Giselle Benatar, Out on a Limb, ENT. WKLY., Apr. 9, 1993, at 26.
104. Kathleen O'Steen, Lynch Takes Stand on "Boxing," DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 26,
1993, at 80. Both Lynch and pre-sales executive Larry Sugar testified that Basinger never
requested script changes until she changed agents. Donna Parker, Lynch: Basinger Loved
Script, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 26, 1993, at 1. Although both McElwaine and Basinger
testified that he did not tell her not to appear in the film, both also agreed that "[h]e hated
it. He thought it was the worst movie he had ever read and said tomatoes would be thrown
at the screen." Transcript, supra note 101, at 1207; cf Kathleen O'Steen, 1CM Exec Didn't
Nix "Helena," He Testifies, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 18, 1993, at 3. Moreover, since the trial,
Basinger has indicated that she acted on McElwaine's advice. Brennan, supra note 6, at 6.
105. Main Line Trial Brief, supra note 7, at 7. Another potential manifestation of
agent self-interest is the practice followed by large agencies, such as ICM, of "packaging"
several of their clients in a single project. 2 HowARD ORNSTEIN & DAVID E. GunN,
ENTERTAINMENT LAW & BusINESS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND Busn mS PRAcTIcEs OF
THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY § 12.2.2 (1993). Because the agencies are paid for assem-

bling all the talent for a film, the practice has been described as "inherently corrosive of an
agent's devotion to a client." Janice Castro, The Ultimate Mogu

Is Michael Ovitz Getting

Too Powerful?, TIME, Apr. 19, 1993, at 54. However, the Screen Actors Guild conflict-ofinterest rules that prohibit agents from producing projects do not cover "packaging." Fred
Jelin, The PersonalManager Controversy: Carvingthe Turf, ENT. L. REP., June 1985, at 6.
106. California Jury Awards Main Line $8.92 Million over "Boxing Helena," ENT. LiTG. REp., Apr. 27, 1993.
107. O'Steen, supra note 4; see also CaliforniaJudge Trims Main Line's "Boxing Helena" Award by $1.5 Million, ENT. LrrG. REp., June 28, 1993.
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Kim to get out of her10commitment
to do that film. It was a scheme
8
called script control.'

Because of the mixed motive rule, the jury was never given the opportunity to weigh the evidence. The extent to which jurors believed Basinger's breach was attributable to her agent's advice remains a
mystery.
C.

The Critique of the Rule

The primary problem with the mixed motive rule is that it fails to
allow for what the Restatement requires-a fact-specific, case-by-case
balancing of relative interests to determine whether the inducement at
issue was improper. 109 The consequences of this regression to formalism are most severely felt in entertainment cases that, like Main Line
v. Basinger and Lumley v. Gye, involve executory personal services

contracts. To understand why, it is helpful to consider the rule's effect
on both the plaintiff and the defendant in a relational inducement
case.
(1) Undercompensationfor Victims of the Breach

The inducement tort envisions the right to performance as a
property right enforceable against the world." 0 Critics of the tort
have described this paradigm as inconsistent with the notion of efficient breach."' However, even the critics acknowledge that personal
service contracts defy the efficiency model." 2 This is because the limi108. Id. See also Donna Parker, BasingerScript Ploy Alleged, HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar.
4, 1993; Ari Posner, 9 1/2 million?, PREmIERE, June 1993, at 39 (describing how the "'big
conspiracy theory' carried the day with the jury").
109. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 28-29. This characterization is especially appropriate in the motion picture business in which a commitment to appear in a film is used as an asset by a
producer to presell distribution rights and to attract other talent to the project. See BeVier, supra note 19, at 924 ("Property right protection of Promisee's contract entitlement
makes sense in relational cases ... in large part because a contract-specific investment by
Promisee is so often a feature of relational contracts.").
111. Professor Perlman states their position succinctly:
In efficiency terms, there is no reason why formation of one contract should...
prevent third parties from inducing non-performance of inefficient contracts.
Contract rules seem designed to facilitate breach where efficiency gains result; the
inducer liability rule, in contrast, seems designed to reduce the number of such
breaches and thus runs counter to a plausible objective of contract doctrine.
Perlman, supra note 30, at 83.
112. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with ContractualRelationships, 34
ARK.L. REv. 335, 374-76 (1980). Professor Dobbs notes that personal services contracts
are quite different from "market-oriented" contracts and that the specific performance
remedy is itself a recognition of the right to unique performance as property. Id.at 374.
He concedes that "though the efficient breach philosophy may work and even work well in
some cases of market-oriented contracts, nonmarket-oriented contracts, and especially
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tations on expectation damages coupled with the unavailability
of specific performance render contract remedies inadequate.11 3
Damages based on the plaintiff's expectation interest fail to
achieve full compensation in unique performance cases for two reasons. First, they fail to account for litigation costs." 4 Second, they
often cannot be proved with any precision." 5 For example, one can
imagine Main Line's difficulty in estimating the value of the time and
effort spent preselling its film based on Basinger's promise to appear"16 or the film's potential earnings had Basinger fulfilled her
promise." 7 Moreover, specific performance is not available for the
relational contracts that are typically the subject of inducement
claims. 1 8 Courts generally refuse to order specific performance to
compensate for the inadequacy of damages in such cases because of
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude." 9
those involving unique performances, are and should be treated differently." Id. at 375.
Professor Perlman's resolution is far less satisfying. While he concedes the lack of active
markets for unique personal services and the unavailability of specific performance, he
cites noncompete covenants as "remedies which for practical purposes reach the same result as specific performance at less cost." Perlman, supra note 30, at 86-87; see also Partlett,
supra note 26, at 774-75 (explaining that the efficient breach theory is not applicable to the
"peculiarly relational" contracts typically litigated in inducement cases).
113. See BeVier, supra note 19, at 911 (explaining that the "legal remedies for breach
of relational contracts are unlikely to serve the full compensation goal of contract law").
114. Epstein, supra note 29, at 36-37.
115. Id. at 37-38. Professor Epstein notes that damages resulting from a breach of a
contract for unique services are often too speculative to be awarded and that
"[u]nfortunately, it is precisely with nonstandard ... services that inducement of breach is
likely to take place." Id. at 37. Thus, the problem is most acute in entertainment cases. Id.
116. Main Line suggested that such preproduction costs are better characterized as
reliance damages. Main Line Trial Brief, supra note 7, at 19-20; but see BeVier, supra note
19, at 910-11 n.124 (noting that the reliance measure of damages presents "valuation
problems that render reimbursement every bit as impractical and error-prone as expectation damages"); Epstein, supra note 29, at 38 (describing the forward planning required for
entertainment projects and the difficulty in calculating its cost in subsequent litigation).
117. With Basinger committed to the project, Main Line generated $7.6 million by
"preselling" foreign distribution rights and had a $3 million domestic distribution offer.
With Sherilyn Fenn, Basinger's replacement, the foreign presales were $2.7 million, and, at
the time of the trial, Main Line still had not found a domestic distributor. As one observer
suggested, the jury may have used the difference in the sales figures as a rough approximation of lost profits. Donna Parker, "Boxing" Scores BasingerKO, HOLLYwOOD REP., Mar.
25, 1993, at 1; see also BeVier, supra note 19, at 910 (expectation damages are uncertain in
relational cases because of lack of market substitutes).
118. See BeVier, supra note 19, at 910.
119. Epstein, supra note 29, at 30. A typical actor agreement contains a provision that
the actor's services are "unique and irreplaceable" and gives the producer the right to seek
an injunction against its breach in recognition that the loss could not be fully compensated
in a contract suit. PETER MULLER, SHOW Bus, ss LAW 38 (1991). However, courts
rarely grant such injunctions. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3423(e) (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting injunctions against the breach of certain personal services contracts); Beverly Glen
Music, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 224 Cal. Rptr. 260,261 (Ct. App. 1986) ("An
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Even a plaintiff who prevails on a contract claim against a breaching performer may remain undercompensated because of the protections available to individuals under the bankruptcy laws. The Main
Line case is a perfect illustration. Although the judgment against her
was reduced to $7.4 million, 120 Basinger filed for Chapter 11 protection one day before she would have had to post a bond securing the
judgment pending appeal.' 2 ' After months of negotiation, she converted her petition to a Chapter 7 liquidation, a move that threatened
to cost Main Line millions. 22 Main Line's attorneys protested, 23 but
ultimately agreed to a settlement with Basinger's trustee. 24 The settlement had not received court approval when the reversal was announced, and it was quickly withdrawn. 125
As early as Lumley v. Gye,' 26 it was suggested that because the
breaching party often cannot cover the damages, the inducer should
be held liable to cover the shortfall. 127 One commentator has noted
that "[i]nducer liability can be conceptualized as a means of bonding
Promisor's performance, thereby adding credibility to Promisor's reputation as a reliable contracting partner. 1 28 In cases in which the
promisor is unable to pay damages, the inducement tort "opens the
potentially deep pocket of the interferer" to insure that the promisee
unwilling employee cannot be compelled to continue to provide services to his employer
either by ordering specific performance of his contract, or by injunction. To do so runs
afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.").
120. Kathleen O'Steen, Basinger Levy is Lowered, DAILY VARIETY, May 20, 1993, at
16.
121. Kathleen O'Steen, Basinger Files Chapter11, DAILY VARIETY, May 27, 1993, at 1.
122. Dan Cox, Basinger Files for Chapter 7, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 28, 1993, at 3. At
trial Basinger had valued her assets at over $5 million, but her appraisers later reduced
their estimate to between $2 million and $3 million. Id.
123. See Dan Cox, Main Line Strikes Back, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 29, 1993, at 3 (reporting Main Line's contention that Basinger manipulated the bankruptcy laws to insulate
her postbankruptcy earnings).
124. Kathleen O'Steen, Basinger Wins 'Helena' Appeal, DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 23,
1994, at 1.
125. Id. See also Carol Marie Cropper, The BasingerBankruptcy Bomb, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1995, § 3, at 1 (describing the Basinger case as an illustration "of the way the bankruptcy court's shield can be used as a sword" and commenting that the reversal "leaves
everything in chaos").
126. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
127.
The servant or contractor may be utterly unable to pay anything like the amount
of the damage sustained entirely from the wrongful act of the defendant; and it
would seem unjust, and contrary to the general principles of law, if such wrongdoer were not responsible for the damage caused by his wrongful and malicious
act.
Itd at 755.
128. BeVier, supra note 19, at 925; see also Epstein, supra note 29, at 33 (referring to
the inducer as a guarantor for damages resulting from the breach).
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is fully compensated.129 Few inducers are as deep-pocketed as entertainment agencies, but, because of the mixed motive rule, they cannot be held accountable, even for predominantly self-serving
inducements.
(2) Complete Immunity for Self-Serving Agents

If Main Line's allegations are true, the case illustrates how selfserving agents may induce a breach and then hide behind the manager's privilege, leaving only the principal responsible for damages.
This frustrates the function of the inducement tort as a deterrent
against such behavior. 130 Moreover, it is particularly inappropriate for
entertainment agents to benefit from an absolute privilege, given the
extent of their influence over their clients and the resulting opportunities for self-dealing.
Critics of the inducement tort have argued that it requires courts
to assume that the breaching promisor is less than an autonomous person capable of making his own decisions. 131 However, this critique
ignores the fact that some individuals have less business acumen than
others and therefore rely extensively on advisors to manage their affairs. This description
typifies the relationship between an entertainer
32
and his agent.
In theory, an agent is concerned principally with booking
projects, 33 while a personal manager handles the artist's business affairs and provides long-term career guidance. 34 In practice, the roles
have become blurred. 135 To a great extent, this is because large agen129.

Danforth, supra note 58, at 1512.

130. See id. (describing the deterrent function of inducer liability).
131. See Dobbs, supra note 112, at 358.
132. See Hal I. Gilenson, Note, Badlands: Artist-PersonalManagerConflicts of Interest
in the Music Industry, 9 CARnozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 501,541 (1991) (suggesting that many
entertainers lack business sophistication); ORENSTEMIN & GuINN, supra note 105, § 12.1.
Orenstein notes that creative artists often struggle with the commercial aspects of the entertainment business:
It is somewhat cliche to say that creators and performers "seldom have good
business or administrative sense." Nonetheless, the cliche does possess a kernel
of truth. While some creative artists are brilliant business people well capable of
managing their careers, many are not.... Moreover, whether capable or not, the
individual may feel that his time is better served concentrating on performing and
perfecting creative work rather than spending it upon the related matters of managing a career.

Id. (citation omitted).
133. MULLER, supra note 119, at 21-22.
134. Id. at 10-13; see also Jelin, supra note 105, at 3-4 (explaining that a personal manager maintains business and personal matters and gives career advice).
135.

HowARD SIEGAL, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 388 (1989); see also BIEDERMAN ET AL.,

supra note 9, at 3 (noting that the line between agent and personal manager is often hard
to define).
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cies, such as ICM, have taken on both responsibilities. 136 As a result,
agents today are among the most powerful people in the entertainment industry. 137 They handle every facet of their clients' careers and

represent everyone from the artists to their employers. 38 Because of
the experience and influence of agents, entertainers trust their agents'
judgment and often develop close relationships with them. 139
Although Basinger had a business advisor (her brother)' 4° and a
business manager' 4 ' when the decision to pull out of Boxing Helena
was made, her agent was likely the most influential voice on career
decisions. He acknowledged the scope of his creative influence when
he commented to a Main Line executive that he had been hired to
turn the actress's image around. 142

As the entertainment agent's roles multiply and influence expands, the potential for self-dealing increases. Rather than take this
into account, the mixed motive rule throws a blanket of immunity
over all advisors without regard to their relative influence or the various conflicts of interest they face. The resulting combination of maxi136. See JOSEPH TAUBMAN, PERFORMING ARTS MANAGEMENT AND LAW 44 (1972)
(describing how the large agencies handle the business affairs of the artist in addition to
booking projects).
137. See generally Alan Citron, Talent Agencies Find Galaxies Beyond the Stars, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at D1.
The top agencies these days function as everything from merchandising consultants to merchant bankers, in addition to influencing the trends in movies, television and music. . . . Most agencies are loaded with lawyers, accountants and
MBAs capable of doing far more than the old-line tasks of booking concert tours,
making book deals and securing movie and TV parts for their clients.
Id. The most powerful of the agents, Michael Ovitz, is perhaps the most influential figure
in the industry. Castro, supra note 105, at 54 ("If you are a movie executive or producer
and you want to get a film made, it's possible to proceed without Ovitz's complicity-but
not advisable.").
138. Michael Ovitz's Creative Artist Agency (CAA) drew considerable criticism in
1991 for agreeing to represent the Coca-Cola Company, a move that prompted a rival
agent to ask, "How is it possible to represent talent, with his list of 650 clients, and represent the best interests of the employer? How can he get both the best person and the best
price?" Cleveland Horton, Coke/CAA Draws Flak, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 30, 1991, at
1. More recently, CAA garnered similar conflict-of-interest accusations when it decided to
represent Credit Lyonnais, a French bank specializing in film finance that also owns the
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studio. James Bates & Alan Citron, Conflict Charges Fly as Two
Agencies Clash, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, at D1.
139. Andrea Eastman, one of Basinger's former agents, has compared the agent-client
relationship to a marriage. Elaine Dutka, The Clout is in the Client and Other True Tales of
Women Agents, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1993, (Calendar), at 7.
140. Main Line Trial Brief, supra note 7, at 6.
141. Id. A business manager's responsibilities are typically limited to the artist's finances. BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.

142.

Kathleen O'Steen, "Helena" Some Mean Role,
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mal power with minimal accountability does more than fail to deter
abuse-it encourages it.
While no combination of contract and tort remedies can ensure
optimal compensation and deterrence in every case, 143 the beauty of
the inducement tort is its flexibility. However, factors such as the
plaintiff's inability to recover his loss and the extent of the agent's
influence over the principal are never weighed under the mixed motive rule. This violates the clear intention of the Restatement authors
that privilege be a factually oriented inquiry.144
Nevertheless, Judge Reinhardt's point that "advice by an agent to
a principal is rarely, if ever, motivated purely by a desire to benefit
only the principal"1 45 is well taken. If the mixed motive rule is to be
rejected, any alternative rule must be able to consistently resolve
those cases in which the agent's motive is indeed mixed. This Note
contends that a predominant motive rule will best enable the fact
finder to balance the issues at stake in each individual case.
IV.

The Predominant Motive Rule

In discussing mixed motive inducement cases, the late Dean Prosser suggested that "here, as in the case of mixed motives in the exercise of a privilege in defamation and malicious prosecution, the court
may well look to the predominant purpose underlying the defendant's
conduct."'146 While clearly undermined by the Los Angeles Airways
mixed motive rule, this suggestion nevertheless has appeared in a
number of California cases and has been openly embraced in at least
one state. Before discussing the application of the predominant motive rule in interference cases, this Note will briefly examine how the
rule is applied, as Dean Prosser noted, in both defamation and malicious prosecution cases.
A. Defamation
In addition to the better-known constitutional privilege, a defamation privilege exists at common law in "a variety of situations in
which the interest which the defendant is seeking to vindicate or further is regarded as being sufficiently important.., so that publication
143. Epstein, supra note 29, at 41.
144. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
145. Los Angeles Airways, 687 F.2d at 328; see also ORENSTEIN & GuiN*, supra note
105, § 12.2.1 (noting that even a well-intentioned entertainment agent "may find his or her
career advice influenced by his or her own interests").
146. KEETON ET AL, supra note 19, at 984.
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of defamation should be conditionally or qualifiedly privileged."'
However, like the qualified privilege to interfere with contracts, these
defamation privileges are lost if the defendant acts with malice. Of
course, the inherent problems with ascertaining motive arise here as
well, especially when the circumstantial evidence suggests that the defendant's motives were mixed. Therefore, "the court will look to the
primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently is inspired.... [T]he privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose
of furthering the interest which is entitled to
8
protection."14
Because relative motivation can only be determined by weighing
the circumstantial evidence presented, "[u]nless only one conclusion
can be drawn from the evidence, the determination of the question
whether the privilege has been abused is for the jury."' 4 9 Therefore,
in Frisk v. Merrihew,150 the California Court of Appeal reversed a directed verdict for the defendant in a defamation action, noting that
[t]he question of whether a privileged occasion was abused is for the
determination of the jury unless the facts permit but one conclusion.
The facts of the instant case do permit drawing more than one conclusion and the question of whether the privileged occasion was
abused cannot be determined as a matter of law.' 51

147. Id. at 824-32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-598A (both describing
various qualified privileges). In California the qualified privilege is codified in Section
47(c) of the Civil Code, which applies only to
a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who
is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the
information.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 1994).
148. KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, at 834. This rule applies even when the primary
motive "may be legitimate enough in itself but is not within the privilege .... Id. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 (explaining that the qualified privilege is lost if a
defendant "does not act for the purpose of protecting the interest for the protection of
which the privilege is given"); 6 CAL. JUR. 3D § 206, at 620 (same). Thus, as in the inducement context, malice is quite broadly defined. In Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 197
P.2d 713 (Cal. 1948), the California Supreme Court held that the qualified privilege would
be lost "by a publication of defamatory matter for an improper purpose ....or by any
cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege
is given." Id. at 717. See also Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. San Joaquin Superior Court,
254 Cal. Rptr. 389, 396 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that malice is established when the purpose for publication is not within the values protected by the privilege).
149. KEETON, ET AL., supra note 19, at 835. Accord 6 CAL.JUR. 3D § 207, at 622-23.
150. 116 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1974).
151. Id. at 785 (citations omitted). See also Clark v. McClurg, 9 P.2d 505, 507 (Cal.
1932) (denial of motion for nonsuit was proper because circumstantial evidence suggesting
improper motivation justified submitting the question whether privilege was lost to the
jury).

January 19951

REEXAMINING THE AGENT'S PRIVILEGE

The California Supreme Court has also held that in a defamation action, "the question of malice is an independent one-of fact purelyfor the consideration of the jury, and not at all for the
and altogether
52
judge."1

Therefore, when a conditional privilege is asserted in a defamation case, the jury, having considered all the circumstantial evidence

of the defendant's intent, is entrusted to determine the predominant
motive. If the primary motivation was a proper one-one for which
the privilege was established-the privilege is not defeated. However,
if the defendant was primarily motivated by an improper purpose, the
defendant will be liable for publishing the defamatory statements.
B. Malicious Prosecution

To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant acted with malice in instituting a judicial proceeding. 153 Here again, malice "is not limited to actual hostility or ill
will toward plaintiff; it may exist when proceedings are commenced
primarily for an improper purpose."'1 54 Moreover, "[a]s in the cases of
qualified privilege in defamation, the courts seem55to have looked to
the primary purpose behind defendant's action.'
As in defamation cases, the task of ascertaining a defendant's
predominant motivation in a malicious prosecution case is entrusted
to the jury. The California Supreme Court has held that because malice "relates to the subjective intent or purpose with which the defendant acted in initiating the prior action.., the defendant's motivation is
a question of fact to be determined by the jury."' 56 Because "the defendant's improper purpose usually is proved by circumstantial evi152. Davis v. Hearst, 116 P. 530, 539 (Cal. 1911). The court further noted that malice
"may be proved directly or indirectly; that is to say by direct evidence of the evil motive
and intent, or by legitimate inferences to be drawn from other facts and circumstances in
evidence." Id
153. The elements of the cause of action are: "(1) the institution of an action (2) without probable cause and (3) with malice, (4) termination of the maliciously-brought action
in favor of the defendant, and (5) damages resulting from the bringing of the suit." Normandy Towers, Ltd. v. Eddy, 233 Cal. Rptr. 885, 893 (Ct. App. 1987).
154. Camarena v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 820, 825 (Ct. App. 1987); accord
Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 166 (Ct. App. 1992); Jacques Interiors
v. Petrak, 234 Cal. Rptr. 44,48-49 (Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Coombs, 224 Cal. Rptr. 865,
874 (Ct. App. 1986); Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 586, 593 (Ct. App. 1963).
Because malice is so broadly defined, it may be found "when the defendant uses the proseKEETON ET AL., supra
cution for the purpose of obtaining any private advantage ....
note 19, at 883.
155. KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, at 883; see also authorities cited supra note 154.
156. Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 503 (Cal. 1989); see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, at 883 (noting that unless the facts support only one conclusion "the question of 'malice' is to be determined by the jury").
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dence,"'1 5 7 the jury must draw its conclusion "from all the
58
circumstances in evidence.'
Therefore, in both defamation and malicious prosecution cases,
the defendant's predominant motive is dispositive. Motivation is
uniquely an issue of fact, 59 and the application of the predominant
motive rule is thus left to the fact finder, who may infer relative motivation from all the circumstances. It follows that, given the centrality
of malice to the inducement tort, 160 the fact finder should weigh relative motivation in interference cases as well. Unfortunately, because
of the Los Angeles Airways mixed motive rule, this is not the case.
C. Interference with Contract

A number of California interference cases, both before and after
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Airways, have referred to
the inducer's predominant purpose in applying the manager's privilege.' 6 ' Before Los Angeles Airways, even the Ninth Circuit noted
that "California decisions have indicated that whether an intentional

interference is justified depends upon the predominant motive of the
defendant."' 62 Even in Shapoff v. Scull,163 the first California case to
adopt the Los Angeles Airways mixed motive approach, the court described the privilege of a person with a financial interest in the business of another as
157.

KEETON ET AL., supra

note 19, at 883.

158. Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 326 P.2d 918, 928 (Cal. 1958).
159. This has been acknowledged in a variety of other contexts as well. See White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259 (1963) (finding summary judgment inappropriate in an antitrust case "where motive and intent play leading roles"); Stumph v.
Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93, 97 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding summary judgment inappropriate in an age discrimination case "where a material issue involves any weighing of
conflicting indications of motive and intent); Pfizer v. International Rectifier Corp., 538
F.2d 180, 185 (8th Cir. 1976) (observing in a patent case that summary judgment was "notoriously inappropriate for determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith and
other subjective feelings play dominant roles"). See also supra note 65.
160. See supra note 38.
161. See, e.g., Wanland v. Los Gatos Lodge, Inc., 281 Cal. Rptr. 890, 899 (Ct. App.
1991) (explaining that the owner of an entity enjoys a qualified privilege "provided that the
owner's predominant purpose in inducing the breach is to further the entity's interests");
Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 209 Cal. Rptr. 124, 127 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the
applicability of the manager's privilege "turns on the defendants' predominant purpose in
inducing the breach"); Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co., 144 Cal. Rptr. 664, 670 (Ct.
App. 1978) (same); Culcal Stylco, Inc. v. Vornado, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 419, 422 (1972)
(same).
162. Hamro v. Shell Oil Co., 674 F.2d 784,790 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Lowell and Culcal
Stylco).
163. 272 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Applied Equip. Corp. v.
Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 456 (Cal. 1994).
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at most a qualified one dependent for its existence upon the circumstances of the case. It is essentially a state-of-mind privilege and
therefore its existence cannot normally be satisfactorily determined
on the basis of pleadings alone. The resolution of the issue turns on
the defendants' predominant purpose in inducing the breach of the
contract. This is preferably a matter to be determined on the basis
of proof rather than of pleading. 164

However, in the next paragraph, the court embraced the mixed motive rule for managers and advisors:
To claim the privilege, a manager or advisor need not be acting
solely on behalf of his employer or client; rather he is entitled to the
protection of the privilege so long as he can establish his employer's
interest was one of the factors motivating his conduct or
or client's
165
advice.
The court does not appear to grasp that, if the principal's interest need

only be "one of the factors" motivating an agent's conduct, the agent's
"predominant purpose" in inducing the breach is utterly irrelevant. In
other words, if only a scintilla of proper motivation is required, why
should the court concern itself with whether the motivation was 51%
proper?
Also inconsistent with the Los Angeles Airways rule is the assertion in a number of California cases that motivation in interference
cases is an issue of fact for the jury. 166 If an agent need only claim to
have had the principal's best interests at heart to remove the issue
from the jury, these assertions ring hollow. It is hard to imagine the
case in which an agent would be unable to show that, for a fleeting
moment, the best interest of the principal crossed his mind and consequently influenced his advice. 67
164. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 486 (citations omitted).
166. See e.g., Plate v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 275 Cal. Rptr. 667, 672 (Ct. App. 1990)
(describing whether a corporate agent acted for the best interest of the corporation as "an
essentially factual question for the trial court"); Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 209
Cal. Rptr. 124, 127 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the application of the privilege "is a
question for determination by the trier of fact"); Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen,
194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 199 (Ct. App. 1983) (describing whether interference was proper as
"peculiarly a question for determination by the trier of fact"), overruled on other grounds,
Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 456 (Cal. 1994); H & M
Associates v. City of El Centro, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1980) (noting that
privilege "comprises a factual issue which should properly be placed before the trier of
fact"); Skelly v. Richman, 89 Cal. Rptr. 556, 568 (Ct. App. 1970) (noting that motives for
inducement "must be found through somewhat veiled inferences" and holding that "[t]he
matter of motive is for the trier of fact").
167. In at least one interference case, Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 254
Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1989), the California Court of Appeal did emphasize the role of
the jury. Affirming a jury verdict against film producer Michael Phillips, the court rejected
the argument that his motives had been mixed and that his actions had been privileged as a
matter of law-
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While California courts have struggled to resolve these contradictions,168 courts in at least one other jurisdiction have followed Pros-

ser's suggestion and applied the predominant motive rule. In Alyeska
Pipeline Service v. Aurora Air Service, 69 a jury ruled against Alyeska,
which had induced RCA to terminate its relationship with Aurora, a
rival air transportation company. Alyeska appealed the trial court's
denial of its summary judgment motion and refusal to give a proposed
instruction that it could only be liable if it acted with "the sole intent
of injuring plaintiff.' 70 Rejecting these arguments and explicitly
adopting Prosser's predominant motive rule, the Alaska Supreme
Court also noted that "[tjhe question of justification for invading the
contractual interest of another is normally one for the trier of fact,
171
particularly when the evidence is in conflict."'
Alyeska contended that its true motive in causing RCA to terminate its relationship with Aurora was its concern with safety-it be72
lieved it could provide safer air transport services than Aurora.

This argument formed the basis for Professor Dobbs's stringent critique of the Alyeska decision; after posing the facts of the case as a
hypothetical he asked:
But what is to be done if the jury finds I was motivated by spite, yet
also had good safety reasons for acting as I did? It would be possible, following a suggestion made by the late Dean Prosser, to look
for the dominant motive. This should be an interesting job and fully
rewarding as counting angels on the point of a needle. But if we did
that, we would find ourselves telling the jury something like this:
"If you find that the defendant was actuated by malice, either
Resolution of the existence of the privilege was "peculiarly a question for determination by the trier of fact." The jury was specially instructed that if Phillips...
[was] materially motivated by a desire to benefit [his principal], then he was not
liable for conspiracy to induce breach of contract. The jury's finding against Phillips necessarily means that it determined that he was not acting in a privileged
capacity.
Id at 654 (citations omitted). While the "materially motivated" standard this instruction
appears to suggest falls short of the predominant motive rule, it would at least represent an
improvement on the mixed motive rule.
168. See Aalgaard v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, Inc., 274 Cal. Rptr. 81, 86 (Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing contradictory authority and concluding that the question whether the manager's privilege is qualified or absolute has become "somewhat muddled in California
law").
169. 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979).
170. Id. at 1095.
171. Id. at 1094 (citations omitted). See also Hatten v. Union Oil Co., 778 P.2d 1150,
1153 (Alaska 1989) (applying Alyeska to hold that because all inferences must be drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party, "the trial court erred in granting summary judgment since a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to [defendant's] predominant motivation").
172. Alyeska, 604 P.2d at 1094 n.5. Aurora, on the other hand, claimed that Alyeska
acted with malice and cited the fact that Aurora had sued Alyeska on a payment dispute
earlier that same year. Itd at 1092.
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wholly or predominantly, then you must find for the plaintiff, even
if you believe the safety considerations in question would have tompelled a rational and non-malicious person to take the same action
taken by the defendant." The result is appalling. Contractors
should be encouraged to provide more, not less, safety. Yet the result called for by this concentration on motive punishes some bad
thoughts by punishing safer behavior.... Courts that give themselves the luxury of this kind of moral condemnation may cause serious injury or death by adjudicating a state of mind rather than a
state of conduct. 173
This argument misses the point for a number of reasons. First, it assumes that weighing relative motivation is uniquely problematic in inducement cases. This oft-repeated critique of the tort's emphasis on
motive
evidences a feeling that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
when the employee-agent is acting with a well intentioned, as opposed to malicious, state of mind. It completely ignores the fact,
well recognized in other areas of the law, that a person's state of
mind can often be discovered by looking at his actions.... Clearly,
the problems of proof regarding intent or motive in this area of the
or more difficult than in other areas of the
law 17
are
4 no different
law.

Moreover, the jury in Alyeska was free to infer from the evidence
that safety was indeed the defendant's predominant concern, but it
concluded otherwise. If the jury had found the alleged safety concerns to be compelling (or anything more than an after-the-fact justification of Alyeska's actions), it likely would have concluded that those
concerns were its primary motivation. The Supreme Court of Utah
has recognized this strength of the Prosser approach, noting that
"[b]ecause it requires that the improper purpose predominate, this alternative takes the long view of the defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be eclipsed by legitimate long-range
economic motivation. Otherwise, much competitive commercial activity ... could become tortious. 1

75

The scenario upon which the

argument is based is therefore highly implausible.
Finally, whether a "rational and non-malicious person" would
have induced the breach is simply not the issue. A neutral observer
might, with the benefit of hindsight, adjudge maliciously motivated
advice to have been astute.176 However, that such an observer might
173. Dobbs, supra note 112, at 349. Ironically, Professor Dobbs is one of the current
editors of the Prosser hornbook.
174. Gamer, supra note 43, at 486-87.
175. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,307 (Utah 1982). See also St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Wade, 607 F.2d 126, 133 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In effect, the
claim of malicious motive is a claim that the alleged justification is merely a pretext.").
176. For example, if Main Line had not sued Basinger and the film had failed at the
box office (as it did), her agent's advice would have proven quite wise. Of course, induce-
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also have advised Kim Basinger to breach her contract should not justify her agent doing so if his predominant motivation was his own financial gain. Far from encouraging safety, in the typical relational
inducement case, the mixed motive rule may encourage self-interested
advisors to put their clients at risk, knowing that they themselves are
protected by a virtually absolute privilege. There is little to deter an
agent from inducing a breach, for the principal bears the entire risk of
liability no matter how improperly motivated the advice may have
been.
In Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors,177 an Oregon appellate court also adopted Prosser's predominant motive rule, noting that
it was "particularly appropriate" when an advisor faced a potential
conflict of interest:
To hold otherwise would immunize corporate entities whose agents
have given advice to breach a contract ostensibly to benefit the advisee but in reality to benefit.., a conflicting interest, resulting in
measurable yet unrecoverable loss to the party with whose contract
they have interfered.
We agree with plaintiff that motive is not generally an appropriate factual issue to be disposed of by summary judgment....
W]e hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
for defendants... because
a factual issue remains as to defendants'
178
agents' primary motive.
Unfortunately, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed in favor of
the Ninth Circuit's mixed motive rule:
In deciding the present case, the Court of Appeals borrowed its
primary motive test from the primary motive concept used to uphold qualified privilege in the defamation context. We disagree that
this is the proper test where agents who induce a breach of contract
act from "mixed motives" ....
[T]he proper test is whether the agent acts... with the intent to
benefit the principal. When this test is met an agent is not liable to
a third party for intentional interference with contract even 1if79 the
agent acts with mixed motives to benefit himself ...as well.
The court's further comment that an agent can be liable only if he
"acts against the best interests of the principal or acts solely for his
own benefit"' 8 0 suggests a standard for liability far more arbitrary
than predominant motivation-a hindsight-biased evaluation of the
agent's advice. Does the court mean that if, for example, Boxing Hement claims typically arise in conjunction with a suit on the contract. In most cases, therefore, following the agent's advice has already, at a minimum, resulted in the advisee getting
sued.
177. 646 P.2d 57 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
178. Id. at 60-61.
179. Welch v. Bancorp Mgmt. Advisors, 675 P.2d 172, 178 (Or. 1983).
180. Id. at 178-79.
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lena had been a box office smash, ICM could have been liable for
acting "against the best interests of the principal"?
Perhaps the courts and commentators who reject the predominant motive rule are concerned that it would render summary judgment virtually impossible in inducement cases. This fear is
unfounded. While the rule would undoubtedly allow more inducement claims to reach the jury, summary judgment would still be
granted in any case in which "there is no genuine issue as to" 18 '
whether the inducer's predominant motivation was self-dealing. The
mere possibility that the agent was motivated by his own interests
would not prevent summary judgment. For a claim to survive, the evidence must permit a reasonable inference that the inducer's predominant concern was personal gain.
In fact, the predominant motive rule strikes the best possible balance between the certainty of a categorical rule and the flexibility of
case-by-case balancing. Because agents, managers, and other fiduciaries face a wide variety of conflicts and their relationships require varying levels of protection from judicial scrutiny, a sweeping rule
applicable to a broad category of "advisors"'18 can leave jilted promis183
ees without a remedy and may actually encourage inducement.
Moreover, because every agency relationship is different, any attempt
to craft categorical rules for each type of agent (e.g., corporate employees, attorneys, personal managers, booking agents) is doomed to
fail because roles and responsibilities often overlap 84 and may vary
widely within a given category. Finally, an ad hoc approach would
provide agents with nothing to guide their conduct, for liability would
depend on the whims of the jury. In contrast, the predominant motive
rule allows consideration of motive within the discipline of an objective standard of liability.
Conclusion
The Los Angeles Airways mixed motive rule gives agents a virtually unfettered license to promote their own interests at the expense
of their principals' promisees. A regression to formalism, the rule assumes that corporate employees, attorneys, business advisors, and
other agents all share the same incentives and all need the same
shroud of privilege to protect their fiduciary relationships from
outside scrutiny. Moreover, it violates the clear intention of both Re181. FED. R. Crv. F. 56(c); see also CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 437c(c) (West Supp. 1995)
(providing for summary judgment when "there is no triable issue as to any material fact").

182. See supra text accompanying note 84.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 110-142.
184. See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
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statements that a factual finding of justification or propriety, and not
merely the inducer's status as an agent, should determine liability.
On the other hand, the predominant motive rule properly returns
the focus to the defendant's intent and provides a clear test for impropriety. Privilege is an issue of fact that should be reserved for the
finder of fact. By applying the predominant motive rule, judges and
juries will better balance the competing interests at stake in inducement cases just as they do in defamation and malicious prosecution
cases; and "mixed motive managers" will be held accountable when
they exploit their influence to engage in self-dealing at the expense of
third party contractual rights.

